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Local Government Revenue Mobilisation in Anglophone Africa1 
 
Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Kari Heggstad 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper examines opportunities and constraints facing local revenue mobilisation in 
anglophone Africa, with an emphasis on urban settings. It discusses specific revenue 
instruments and their effects on economic efficiency, income distribution and accountability. 
In particular, it addresses political and administrative constraints facing various revenue 
instruments and factors affecting citizens’ compliance. The analysis is illustrated with 
examples from across anglophone Africa. A general conclusion emerging from the study is 
that local revenues mobilised in most local government authorities in Africa are necessary 
but not sufficient to develop and supply adequate services for the fast-growing population. 
On this basis, areas for further research on local government revenue mobilisation in Africa 
are identified. 
 
Keywords: local government, decentralisation, taxes, business licences, user fees, Africa 
 
Odd-Helge Fjeldstad is an economist (Dr. Oecon) with more than 25 years of experience of 
research and policy analysis in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Middle East.  He has 
published widely on taxation, both scholarly and policy-oriented. Thematically his work can 
be grouped into three main areas: (i) tax evasion and fiscal corruption; (ii) taxation and state-
building; and (iii) local government taxation and financial management.  Odd-Helge has 
considerable experience in research management, and has served as a director of major 
multidisciplinary research and training programmes, including the U4 Anti-Corruption 
Resource Centre.  Currently, he is Senior Researcher at Chr. Michelsen Institute in Norway, 
and Research Director of the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD). 
  
Kari K. Heggstad is a political scientist whose research interests relate to taxation and state 
building, revenue administration, tax evasion and financial crime. While contributing to this 
paper, she was employed as a research officer at Chr. Michelsen Institute and the 
International Centre for Tax and Development. Kari has also been a staff member of the 
Botswana Institute for Development and Policy Advice (BIDPA) and Bergen University 
College. 
  
                                                     
1  This paper was prepared for the inception phase of the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD). We 
would like to thank Olav Lundstøl, Stephen Peterson, Ingrid Hoem Sjursen and an anonymous reviewer for 
constructive comments on earlier drafts. Points of view and possible errors rest entirely with the authors.   
 
 4 
Contents 
 
 
  
Introduction           5 
 
1. Tax assignment rules and fiscal transfers      6 
 1.1 Who levies which taxes?        6 
 1.2 Transfers from central government       7 
 
2. Features of local government tax systems    11 
 
3. Local government ‘own revenue’ instruments    13 
 3.1 Property tax        14 
 3.2 Business licences       19 
 3.3 User fees – linking payment and service delivery   23 
 
4. Local government tax collection practices    25 
 
5. Concluding remarks and tentative implications for policy  27 
 
6. Issues for further research       29 
 
 References         31 
 
 
 
Boxes 
Box 1  Intergovernmental transfers in South Africa      8 
Box 2  Unconditional grants to local governments in Ghana and Uganda   9 
Box 3  Reforming the local government revenue system in Tanzania 13 
Box 4  Property taxation and political engagement in Kenya  16 
Box 5  The property tax base in anglophone West Africa   17 
Box 6  Deficient property tax administration in Kampala   18 
Box 7  The Single Business Permit (SBP) in Kenya    21 
Box 8  Streamlining business registration in Entebbe municipality,  
Uganda        22 
Box 9  Free services to the poor in South Africa    23 
Box 10  Improving compliance through shared private water taps in 
  Ondangwa, Namibia       24 
Figures 
Figure 1 Intergovernmental transfers as percentage of total local revenue 
  In some East and Southern African countries (2007)    9 
Figure 2 Property tax reform in a selection of anglophone African countries 15 
Figure 3 Rents in tendering contracts for a rural market in Uganda  27 
 
Table 
Table 1 Types of property tax in anglophone Africa    14  
 5 
Introduction 
 
A sound revenue system for local governments is an essential pre-condition for the success 
of fiscal decentralisation (Bird 2010; Martinez-Vázques and Smoke 2010a; Olowu and 
Wunsch 2003). In addition to raising revenues, local revenue mobilisation has the potential to 
foster political and administrative accountability by empowering communities (Shah 1998; 
Oates 1998). However, prescriptions deriving from the theory and from accepted 
international practice impose huge constraints on the choice of revenue instruments for local 
governments. 
 
The growth of Africa’s population has outpaced local authority capacity for service delivery in 
terms of management, infrastructure, and financing (McCluskey et al. 2003: 3; McCluskey 
and Franzen 2005: 43-44). Firstly, urban municipal authorities, many of which were originally 
instituted as colonial administrative institutions, have not been restructured to cope with the 
fast-growing population (Beall 2000). Secondly, a growing number of residents live in 
informal settlements with inadequate basic services such as housing, clean water, electricity, 
sanitation, refuse collection, roads, and transport (Devas 2003). Thirdly, many local 
government authorities are financially weak and rely on financial transfers and assistance 
from central government (Brosio 2000). Moreover, local government tax administrations are 
often inefficient and not able to properly account for revenues collected (Fjeldstad 2006). 
 
As a result, many local governments in Africa are facing a governance crisis and poor 
service delivery capability. Fiscal decentralisation – the devolution of revenue mobilisation 
and spending powers to lower levels of government – has become a main theme of local 
governance in recent years. The purpose of this paper is to examine opportunities and 
constraints facing local revenue mobilisation in anglophone Africa, with a focus on urban 
settings.2 It discusses the various instruments available, their revenue potential, and how 
they affect economic efficiency, income distribution and accountability. The paper also 
addresses political and administrative constraints facing local revenue mobilisation, and 
factors that affect citizens’ compliance. The emphasis is on local government ‘own revenue’, 
but fiscal transfers from the central level are also covered. The paper argues that local 
governments need to be given access to adequate resources to do the job with which they 
are entrusted. However, the revenues mobilised by most local authorities in Africa are 
generally not sufficient to develop and supply adequate services for the fast-growing 
population. Hence, a general conclusion that emerges from the study is that local own 
revenues are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for fiscal decentralisation.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. The first section provides a brief review of the established 
rules of tax assignment between levels of government, and key features of intergovernmental 
fiscal transfer systems in anglophone Africa. Challenges facing the reform of local 
government revenue systems in Africa are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 focuses on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the major local ‘own revenue’ instruments, particularly property 
tax, business licence and user fee regimes. Methods for revenue collection are addressed in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes by outlining some policy implications. The final section 
identifies areas for further research based on the previous analysis.  
 
 
                                                     
2  A separate paper covering both francophone and anglophone countries in Africa was produced for the ICTD during 
the inception phase (Brun et al. 2012). The purpose of that paper was to identify areas for comparative research on 
local government taxation in Africa. 
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1. Tax assignment rules and fiscal transfers 
 
In general, there are two main sources of revenue for local government authorities (LGAs) in 
Africa: (i) own revenue, which includes taxes, user fees, and various licences (Bahl and Bird 
2008); and (ii) transfers from the central or regional levels, usually in the form of grants and 
revenue sharing (Bahl and Smoke 2003: 71). In some countries municipalities are allowed to 
borrow in order to finance investments in local capital infrastructure (Yatta and Vaillancourt 
2010: 42; Bahl and Smoke 2003: 8).3 This section briefly reviews some general principles for 
revenue assignment between different levels of government, and discusses challenges to 
securing fiscal responsibility at subnational levels with respect to intergovernmental transfer 
systems. 
 
Although other revenue sources may exist at subnational levels, these are not covered by 
this study. For instance, external financial contributions provide considerable funding to 
constituencies at village and local level in some countries. These sources are dominated by 
aid projects or programmes funded by a mix of international non-governmental organisations, 
bilateral and multilateral donors (Yatta and Vaillancourt 2010; Fjeldstad 2001). Often the 
local government has little or no knowledge of such projects at either the planning or 
execution phase. In many rural areas, various forms of self-help activities contribute to the 
maintenance of public services, such as village roads, primary schools and health facilities. 
Although data on the extent of self-help activities is not available, studies from Tanzania in 
the 1990s indicate that these contributions are significant (Cooksey and Mmuya 1997; 
Semboja and Therkildsen 1995). Recently, constituency development funds and social action 
funds, operating outside local government budgets, have become important funding sources 
for social and economic development projects at the local level in some countries, for 
instance, in Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda (Baskin 2010).  
 
1.1 Who levies which taxes? 
 
There is no ideal assignment of revenue sources between central and lower levels of 
government. Still, a set of tax-assignment rules has been developed in traditional fiscal 
federalism theory (Oates 2005, 1972; Musgrave 2000; Bird 2010). These principles relate to 
the respective responsibilities of central and lower tiers of government in macroeconomic 
stabilisation, income redistribution, and resource allocation (Boadway et al. 2000). 
Furthermore, in developing countries the administrative capabilities of local governments in 
revenue design (deciding on revenue bases and setting rates) must be taken into 
consideration (Bird 1990). In large and diverse countries it is also important to address the 
issue of revenue harmonisation between jurisdictions when assigning taxing powers. 
 
The need for stabilisation of the fiscal system leads to central control over the revenue 
instruments that may substantially influence central budget deficits or inflation. Thus, taxes 
on international transactions (customs duties) and a considerable share of income and 
general sales taxes (such as VAT) should be assigned to central government. If there are 
wide disparities in income and wealth across regions, as there are in many African countries, 
then local taxing powers may exacerbate these differences. Hence, the distributive function 
of government is an argument for centralised, progressive, corporate income and wealth 
taxes. Since the central government can borrow money to make up for shortfalls, it can live 
with the more unstable revenue sources, such as customs duties and income taxes. Local 
governments, by contrast, require relatively stable sources of revenue. Thus, lower-level 
                                                     
3  In some countries, such as Kenya, the amount of the loan is restricted. In other countries, such as Malawi, debt  
service levels are taken into account (Yatta and Vaillancourt 2010). This implies that the supervisory authority cannot 
approve a loan beyond a given debt service threshold. In most countries, supervisory authorities use the criteria of a 
threshold of local government’s own resources to ensure that they can pay back loans. Generally, such borrowing is 
heavily constrained and contributes limited financial resources to the local government level. 
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governments should tax revenue bases with low mobility between jurisdictions. Property tax 
is therefore often called the ideal local tax (see section 3.1). Moreover, if properly designed, 
user charges on trading services such as electricity, water, sanitation, and solid waste 
collection may be attractive local revenue instruments. The same applies to benefit taxes 
such as road and port tolls, and to various licences, which may also have regulatory 
functions (see sections 3.2 and 3.3). 
 
While the general principles and theoretical discussions of revenue assignments summarised 
above are useful reference points, in practice country-specific factors play a crucial role when 
considering the best way to divide revenue responsibility between central and lower tiers of 
government (Bird 2010; Tanzi 2000). The case for centralisation is usually built around 
macroeconomic considerations and equalisation, and the case for local government on 
efficiency considerations and increased accountability. The optimal way to do things, 
however, depends on how the government weighs these considerations (Martinez-Vázques 
and Smoke 2010b; Boex 2009; Bahl and Wallich 1992). Furthermore, the capacity to 
administer revenue instruments is always an important constraint on the assignment of 
taxing powers to lower levels of government in developing countries. Last, but not least, local 
revenue sources must be politically acceptable (Bahl et al. 2003: 75). As a rule of thumb, 
less visible revenue instruments tend to be more acceptable to taxpayers. 
 
Such assessments of tax assignment almost always favour central over subnational taxation. 
Although the literature generally emphasises that each level of government should be 
assigned taxes that are as closely related as possible to the benefits derived from spending 
them, it often also notes that ‘if fiscal decentralisation is to be a reality, subnational 
governments must control their own sources of revenue’ (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2006: 21). 
However, as argued by Bird (2010: 5), it is not easy to satisfy both of these conditions: ‘the 
standard model of tax assignment in a multi-tier governmental structure essentially assigns 
no productive taxes to subnational governments’. Local governments are often left with little 
but property tax, business licences, user charges and market fees, although, as discussed in 
section 3, a wide range of low revenue-producing instruments is often in place.  
 
1.2 Transfers from central government 
 
Almost without exception, governments across the world assign more expenditure functions 
to local authorities than can be financed from their own revenue sources. This is also the 
case across anglophone Africa. The result of this mismatch of functions and finances – 
usually referred to as vertical imbalances – is that local governments are generally 
dependent on transfers from higher levels of government (Bird 2010; Boadway and Shah 
2009; Boex and Martinez-Vazquez 2006; Bird and Smart 2002). In addition, differences in 
local revenue bases and administrative capacities may create problems of equalisation 
(horizontal imbalance) between local government authorities, in particular between rural and 
urban areas. The presence of such imbalances means that one cannot design an 
appropriate system of local government taxation without simultaneously designing an 
appropriate system of intergovernmental transfers (Bird 2010: 1).  
 
There are a number of methods to close the fiscal imbalances of subnational governments, 
some of which also reduce imbalances between jurisdictions (Ahmad 1997: 6). In practice, 
transfers may be in the form of surcharges or revenue sharing, whereby a local government 
receives a share of the revenue from specific taxes collected from within its jurisdiction by the 
central government (McLure 1999: 12). The main mechanism for intergovernmental transfers 
in anglophone Africa, however, is conditional and/or unconditional grants from central to local 
governments (Box 1).4 There are normally four such funding flows (Fjeldstad et al. 2010a): 
                                                     
4  See Ahmad (1997) for a more detailed discussion of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Ajam (2001) provides a 
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• Recurrent block grants: personal emoluments (PE) component 
• Recurrent block grants: other charges (OC) component 
• Recurrent subventions and basket funds 
• Development (investment) grants and development funds 
 
Of these, the recurrent block grant system generally provides the major funding for LGAs. In 
Tanzania, for instance, it supplied 65 per cent of all local government funds in fiscal year 
2006/07, mainly from the PE component; the OC component accounted for less than 25 per 
cent of the recurrent block grant allocations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Several countries have adopted a formula-based recurrent grant system to determine block 
grant ceilings for priority sectors, including primary education, health care, rural water supply, 
agricultural extension services and local road maintenance (Yatta and Vaillancourt 2010). 
The formula-based system designed for allocating grants to LGAs usually has the following 
factors: (i) size of population; (ii) number of school aged children; (iii) poverty count; (iv) 
infant mortality rate; and (v) distance from council headquarters to service outlets as proxy 
for land area. In Uganda, for instance, the Constitution establishes a formula for determining 
the minimum unconditional grant paid to local governments to run decentralised services 
(see Box 2). Besides the unconditional grant, local governments receive conditional and 
equalisation grants (Mugabi 2004: 3; Steffensen and Tidemand 2004).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
detailed presentation of intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa. Boex (2003) and Boex and Martinez-
Vazquez (2006) examine the formula-based grant system applied in Tanzania. 
 
Box 1: Intergovernmental transfers in South Africa 
 
The equitable division of revenue raised nationally among the national, provincial and local 
spheres of government is a principle laid down in the South African Constitution. 
Intergovernmental transfers are therefore an important instrument within the South African 
fiscal system. The national revenue, less a contingency reserve and interest payments on 
state debts, is divided between the three spheres of government (vertical division).  
 
Vertical transfers from the national sphere are mainly carried out via two instruments: 
unconditional shares and conditional grants. The Division of Revenue Act annually 
allocates national revenue to the different levels of government (including projections 
concerning the following two years to assure a certain degree of stability). 
 
The decision on the allocation is based on previous consultations with provincial 
governments and organised local government as well as on the recommendations of the 
Financial and Fiscal Commission (www.ffc.co.za). A baseline allocation, reflecting the 
three year allocations from the last budget, is used as a starting point for consultations. 
 
The Constitution provides that a nonpartisan Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) 
should advise parliament and subnational governments on a variety of issues in 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. These include taxing powers, the allocation of revenue 
between tiers of government, the grants system and borrowing powers. 
 
Source: Chitembo (2009) based on Derichs and Einfeldt (2006) 
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Box 2: Unconditional grants to local governments in Ghana and Uganda 
 
Ghana uses a system where no less than 5 per cent of the total revenue collected by the 
central government is allocated to a ‘Common Fund’ for the disposal of subnational 
governments. 
 
In Uganda, unconditional grants are determined annually with reference to the reassignment 
of tasks between the national and subnational governments. According to the Ugandan 
Constitution, the total amount is calculated using a formula that includes the unconditional 
grant of the previous year, corrected by the increase in the general price level, plus the net 
change in the budgeted costs of running newly devolved or subtracted services. Thus, the 
Ugandan formula takes into account the actual devolution of functions and its budgetary 
implications.  
 
Source: Brosio (2000) and Mugabi (2004). 
 
The level of intergovernmental transfers varies widely between countries and also between 
rural and urban councils within individual countries in East and Southern Africa (Chitembo 
2009). Figure 1 illustrates the share of total local government revenue that stems from 
central government grants. In Botswana, for instance, rural councils receive 92 per cent of 
their total revenue from the central level, compared to 62 per cent for urban areas. In 
Uganda, local governments are heavily dependent on transfers from the central government 
(on average, 88 per cent of total revenue in 2007), while local governments in South Africa, 
on average, generate the bulk of the revenue from ‘own’ sources (89 per cent in 2007).  
 
Figure 1: Intergovernmental transfers as percentage of total local revenue in some 
East and Southern African countries (2007) 
 
Source: Adapted from Chitembo (2009:11) citing Commonwealth Handbook 2007. 
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Transfers and grants also constitute the biggest share of total receipts to local councils in 
anglophone West Africa. According to Jibao (2009: 43), local councils in Nigeria received on 
average almost 78 per cent of their revenue from transfers, in Sierra Leone 74 per cent, in 
Ghana 69 per cent, and in The Gambia 65 per cent. In Liberia revenue collection is 
centralised, and local councils rely totally on transfers from central government.  
 
In the process of fiscal decentralisation, it is important to be aware of the risks for 
macroeconomic management and fiscal discipline. Substantial devolution of revenue and 
spending responsibilities to subnational jurisdictions can affect the central government’s 
ability to carry out stabilisation and macroeconomic adjustment through the budget. The 
destabilising potential of subnational governments is greatest when they face no hard budget 
constraints (Bird 2010; World Bank 2000; Ter-Minassian 1999). Expectation of a bail-out 
when in financial trouble weakens the incentive to economise on costs, and may generate 
resource waste and rigidity within local authorities. These inefficiencies, in turn, may spill 
over into macroeconomic imbalances. In particular, concern for macroeconomic imbalance 
lies behind the common recommendation that strict limits should be imposed on the 
borrowing ability of subnational jurisdictions (Bird and Vaillancourt 1998). It is feared that 
subnational governments that are highly dependent on national transfers may increase their 
current expenditure above their capacity to fund it out of current revenue and then close the 
gap through borrowing. In Kenya the national government has made local government 
access to the Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF) conditional on progressive debt 
reduction (Yatta and Vaillancourt 2010: 44).5 
 
A common pattern is that this dependency on central government transfers affects the local 
councils’ ability to implement their development plans. The transfers are often highly volatile 
and delayed. In Tanzania, for instance, the national guidelines and budget ceilings 
developed by the Ministry of Finance, including information on grants, are often not received 
by the local government authorities until very late in the budgeting process (Fjeldstad et al 
2010b). Consequently, to initiate the planning process, some LGAs use indicative budget 
figures from the previous fiscal year. Jibao (2009) reports that there are cases when District 
Assemblies in Ghana receive their first quarter allocation of the Common Fund in the third or 
fourth quarter of the year, with the other three quarters overlapping into the following fiscal 
year and so on. 
 
Perverse incentives, such as offering equal lump sum transfers to all local governments 
regardless of size, can lead to increased jurisdictional fragmentation. In Uganda, for 
instance, new local governments are constantly being created. This contributes to diluting the 
capacity of local governments in general (Martinez-Vázques and Smoke 2010b: 340). 
However, a major challenge in many anglophone African countries is the implementation of a 
stable and transparent system of transfers, geared to filling gaps between the assigned 
spending and revenue-raising responsibilities of lower-level governments (Boadway and 
Shah 2009; Ter-Minassian 1999). The definition of such a system is far from easy, especially 
given the need to preserve adequate incentives for tax effort and cost effectiveness by the 
subnational governments.  
 
 
 
                                                     
5  According to Yatta and Vaillancourt (2010), around 980 local governments in Algeria were in deficit in 2007. This 
increased to nearly 1,200 in 2008. In Mexico in the mid-1990s provincial borrowing contributed to a situation where 
some states were defined as bankrupt (Tanzi 2000). 
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2 Features of local government tax systems 
 
Many local tax systems in anglophone Africa are characterised by high levels of 
arbitrariness, coercion and corruption (Bahiigwa et al. 2004; Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008; 
Juul 2006; Prichard 2010; Pimhidzai and Fox 2011). A widely-found feature is the huge 
number of revenue instruments used by local authorities (Brosio 2000; Fjeldstad and 
Semboja 2000). Local governments seem to raise whatever taxes, fees, and charges they 
can, often without worrying excessively about the economic distortions and distribution 
effects that these instruments may create. 
 
A complicated and non-transparent local government revenue system is costly to administer 
and can lead to corruption and mismanagement (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2002). Moreover, 
many local taxes distort resource allocation decisions, and inhibit the start-up of new 
enterprises and the achievement of economic growth (Bahiigwa et al. 2004; Devas and Kelly 
2001; Sander 2003). These effects occur when effective rates vary greatly between different 
goods that are traded, or when licence fees are set too high for start-up small-scale 
enterprises to survive. In a study of small and medium sized enterprises in Zambia, Misch et 
al (2011) found that the effective tax burden varies substantially between firms. Enterprises 
face a range of different taxes, fees and licences, and the types of taxes that firms are 
subject to differ – not only between sectors, but also between firms within the same sector. 
The type of fees and levies differs substantially, even among businesses in the same 
municipality.  
 
In addition, the levels and types of local revenue instruments by themselves can result in the 
tax burden falling more on the poor than on the relatively better-off in local communities. A 
recent study from Uganda shows that small, informal non-farm enterprises pay local taxes in 
a regressive way (Pimhidzai and Fox 2011). While the majority of the micro enterprises in the 
Ugandan sample were poor enough to be exempted from national business taxes (i.e. the 
small business tax and VAT), they ended up paying a large share of their profits to local 
authorities – with the poorest paying the highest share of profits. This is mainly due to the 
basic design of the local revenue system and the way revenues are collected. Thus, a top-
down drive towards more taxation of this sector could be counterproductive, and would 
increase the vulnerability of these informal enterprises.  
 
Consultation and cooperation between the central government revenue administration and 
local government authorities are generally limited. In Ghana, for example, national tax 
officials report that local tax officials sometimes urge citizens to pay local taxes instead of 
national taxes (Prichard 2010). Meanwhile, local officials complain that the national 
government has monopolised virtually all the available tax bases, and offers little if any 
administrative support. This lack of coordination has allowed a high degree of arbitrariness 
and abuse to emerge in local tax systems, while little attention is paid to economic efficiency. 
Due to lack of capacity and poor coordination between the central and local government, 
only limited questions are raised at the central level on local government's tax proposals. The 
local revenue systems have often developed without much interference from the centre. 
Furthermore, lack of coordination between the central and local levels has led to duplication 
of taxes, and inconsistencies between taxes imposed by local authorities (e.g. high taxes on 
export crops) and the national government’s policy to encourage export production.  
 
Firms often have to negotiate and provide similar information on their operations to several 
government bodies, imposing high compliance costs on the private sector (Fjeldstad and 
Heggstad 2011). For instance, in Tanzania the City Service Levy, a major local revenue 
source in urban councils, is levied as a fixed percentage of the firm’s turnover (0.1 per cent of 
turnover for the bank/financial sector, and 0.3 per cent for other sectors). It requires the same 
data for tax assessment that the central government tax administration requires for corporate 
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income tax. The duplication of databases also implies higher administrative costs on the 
public sector.  
 
A recent study of the tax systems in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia finds that local 
taxation is still a major constraint on the commercialisation of smallholder agriculture and 
formalisation of small and micro enterprises (ibid.). Specifically, multiple taxes (including fees 
and charges) make it difficult to enter new businesses and markets. Levies are perceived as 
exorbitant, often charged up-front irrespective of the size and type of business (Misch et al. 
2011). New local taxes, fees and charges have been introduced, replacing taxes abolished 
by the government in recent years. This contributes to undermining the legitimacy of the local 
tax system, encourages tax evasion and delays the formalisation of micro and small-scale 
enterprises. Furthermore, it undermines initiatives encouraging compliance such as 
community outreach and taxpayer education.  
 
Arbitrariness, corruption and regressiveness have made local taxes generally unpopular and 
ineffective (Prichard 2010). Despite many comprehensive central government tax reforms 
during the last two decades, until recently local government revenue systems in sub-Saharan 
Africa have remained largely unchanged, with a few exceptions. For instance, in 2003/04 
Tanzania conducted a comprehensive reform of its local revenue system (see Box 3). The 
main elements of this reform were: (i) abolishing unsatisfactory local revenue instruments 
(including the poll tax), which were costly to collect from administrative and political 
perspectives; and (ii) improving the remaining revenue bases by simplifying rate structures 
and collection procedures. The Tanzanian reform demonstrates that radical changes of the 
local revenue system are possible. The longer-term impact of this reform on local 
government revenues, however, has been reduced fiscal autonomy and increased 
dependency on central government transfers (Fjeldstad et al 2010a).6 Uganda abolished its 
graduated personal tax in 2005 in response to its growing unpopularity and politicisation, with 
a similar impact on local revenues (Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008). 
 
Generally, a fundamental requirement when redesigning local revenue systems is greater 
emphasis on the cost-effectiveness of revenue collection, taking into account not only the 
direct costs of revenue administration, but also the overall costs to the economy, including 
compliance costs for taxpayers. In addition, losses through corruption and evasion need to 
be reduced. Clearly, improved revenue administration cannot compensate for bad revenue 
design. Thus, reforming the revenue structure should precede the reform of revenue 
administration, since there is not much merit in making a bad revenue system work a bit 
better. 
 
Nevertheless, surveys in both Tanzania and Uganda indicate that citizens have a general 
appreciation of the need for taxation to support local service provision, but choose non-
compliance due to lack of confidence in local government (Bahiigwa et al. 2004; Fjeldstad et 
al. 2009a). Studies from Tanzania suggest that people's views on local taxation may change 
over time, which has implications for policy design. Based on survey data from 2003 and 
2006, Fjeldstad et al (2009a) found that people were much more positive towards the tax 
system in 2006 compared to three years earlier. This, the authors suggest, was partly due to 
improvements in service delivery, particularly education, health, and law and order, and 
                                                     
6  For instance, a sample of rural councils in Tanzania generated on average only 2% of total revenues in 2005 (after 
the reform) from own sources, compared to 13% in 2002 (before the reform). This drop in own revenue generation is 
partly due to the abolition of many local revenue sources in 2003, including the head tax ‘development levy’, and 
partly due to the sharp increase in central government grants to local government authorities. The larger Ilala 
Municipal Council and Mwanza City Council also experienced a drop in their own contributions to total revenues, 
partly due to the abolition of business licences in 2004. Ilala MC generated 45% of its total revenues in 2005 
compared to 64% in 2002, while Mwanza CC saw a reduction from 48% in 2002 to 22% in 2005 (Fjeldstad et al 
2010a). Business licences were reintroduced in 2011. 
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partly due to reforms which led to less oppressive revenue collection. Corruption, however, 
was perceived by citizens to be a major problem in both surveys, with implications for their 
trust in government and government officials and, thus, their willingness to pay taxes and 
fees. There was also an increasing demand by citizens for more information on revenue 
collected and how the revenue was spent. 
 
Box 3: Reforming the local government revenue system in Tanzania 
 
Until mid-2003, local authorities in Tanzania often had more than 70 different taxes, fees, 
and charges. In addition, there were many sub-groups of specific revenue instruments. There 
were also large variations in the rates imposed by councils on similar revenue bases, which 
led to smuggling of tradable goods across council borders within the country.  
 
In June 2003, a comprehensive reform of the local government revenue system was carried 
out. A large number of so-called nuisance taxes, which were costly to administrate and 
generated limited revenue, were rationalised. In June 2004 local business licences were 
abolished, based on the argument that they provided disincentives for the development of 
local enterprises. The Tanzanian reform demonstrates that radical changes of the local 
revenue system are possible. The longer-term impact of this reform on local government 
revenues, however, has been reduced fiscal autonomy and increased dependency on central 
government transfers. 
 
Work initiated by the ministry responsible for local authorities focuses on reforming the 
current local revenue system and to identify new revenue options. Among the proposals 
discussed are reforms of the property tax system and introduction of a unified business tax. 
As part of this work, business licences were reintroduced in July 2011 (URT 2011: 41). 
Moreover, many councils have started to explore methods to reduce the financial gap caused 
by the rationalisation by: 
 
1. outsourcing revenue collection to private collectors to increase revenue from existing 
sources; 
2. reducing costs (for example, by limiting the number of meetings and workshops and by 
retrenching surplus staff); and 
3. imposing more cost-effective spending (for example, on electricity and stationery). 
 
Current attempts for economic diversification may also help to expand the local revenue 
base in the longer term. Furthermore, co-production of services by councils and local 
communities is on the rise. For instance, an increasing number of primary schools are 
maintained and expanded via self-help schemes combined with technical support from the 
local government authorities. 
 
Source: Fjeldstad et al. (2004). 
 
 
3. Local government ‘own revenue’ 
instruments 
 
As noted above, the local government own revenue systems across anglophone Africa are 
often characterised by a huge number of revenue instruments. However, the main sources of 
own revenue are usually property rates in urban councils, business licences, market fees and 
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various user charges, often surcharges for services provided by or on behalf of the local 
government authority. Nevertheless, the experience of a number of African countries shows 
that these revenue instruments have serious shortfalls. For instance, property taxes can be 
very costly to administer (Brosio 2000:  20; McCluskey and Franzsen 2005), and the 
enforcement of user fees has resulted in widespread resistance to paying from the poorer 
segments of the urban population in some countries (Fjeldstad 2004; Fjeldstad et al 2005). 
Moreover, complex business licensing systems have proved to be major impediments to the 
start-up and expansion of especially micro and small enterprises (Devas and Kelly 2001; 
Sander 2003; Pimhidzai and Fox 2011). However, experience from other regions shows that 
when well administered, these revenue instruments can provide substantial and reliable 
revenues for urban municipalities. 
 
3.1 Property tax 
 
Textbooks on revenue assignment between various levels of government generally argue 
that few fiscally significant taxes are more appropriate to local administration than property 
tax. This is due to the fact that real estate is visible, immobile, and a clear indicator of one 
form of wealth. Hence, in principle, property tax is difficult to avoid, and, if well administered, 
it can represent a non-distortional and highly efficient fiscal tool. 
 
Property tax as an annual tax on real property is levied in all anglophone countries in Africa 
except in the Seychelles (McCluskey and Franzsen 2005). It is usually a local government 
tax, levied mainly in urban areas (Table 1). The property tax is a national tax only in Liberia. 
Rural properties are often not taxed, although property taxation is being extended to rural 
properties in South Africa under the terms of the Local Government: Municipal Property 
Rates Act 6 of 2004 (Franzsen 2007: 12). Namibia introduced a land tax on commercial 
farmers in 2004 in order to fund a land reform programme.  
 
Table 1: Types of property tax in anglophone Africa 
 Property 
transfer tax 
Urban 
property tax 
Value added 
tax 
Rural property 
tax 
Namibia Yes Yes Yes Yes 
South Africa Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kenya Yes Yes Yes In principle 
Mauritius Yes Yes Yes  
Nigeria Yes Yes Yes  
Botswana Yes Yes Yes  
Ghana Yes Yes Yes  
Lesotho Yes Yes Yes  
Malawi Yes Yes Yes  
Sierra Leone Yes Yes Yes  
Tanzania Yes Yes Yes  
Uganda Yes Yes Yes  
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Zambia Yes Yes Yes  
The Gambia Yes Yes   
Swaziland Yes Yes   
Seychelles Yes    
 
 
Note: ‘Yes’ indicates that property taxes are in place. Empty boxes indicate that the tax is not levied in the respective country. 
 
Source: Franzsen (2007:10). 
 
Property tax reforms have taken place in most anglophone African countries for more than a 
decade. Figure 2 gives an overview of when property tax reforms were initiated in selected 
countries since 1997.  
 
Figure 2: Property tax reform in a selection of anglophone African countries 
 
 
Source: Franzsen and Youngman (2009:10).  
 
Property tax revenue accounts for less than 0.5 per cent of GDP in many African countries. 
In the 1990s, property taxes accounted for 40 per cent of all subnational taxes in developing 
countries (Bird and Slack 2002: 6), but less in most African countries. For instance, property 
tax accounted for 10-30 per cent of own revenue in urban councils in Tanzania (Fjeldstad et 
al. 2004), and around 20 per cent in metropolitan councils in South Africa (Bahl and Smoke 
2003). In Ghana property tax accounts for about 14 per cent of the total revenue of local 
assemblies, an average of 6.1 per cent in local councils in Sierra Leone, and less than 10 per 
cent in The Gambia (average for the period 2006-2008). In Liberia, where local councils are 
not allowed to collect revenue, property tax accounts for about 1 per cent of total revenue of 
the central government (Jibao 2009).  
 
Why is property tax not more heavily exploited as a local revenue source in Africa? There are 
a number of constraints that can explain why (Bell and Bowman, 2006): (a) with the 
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exception of Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, property markets are not well developed; 
(b) property registers and valuation rolls are often outdated or not in place; (c) administrative 
capacity and equipment are often limited; (d) the tax base is generally narrowed by extensive 
legal exemptions; and (e) lack of political support to enforce the property tax and political 
interference in revenue collection. Mikesell (2002: 22) argues that the reasons are 
considerably more political than economic (see Box 4). First, those who are more familiar 
with income and consumption taxes than with property taxation exaggerate the difficulty and 
cost of administering an equitable property tax. Second, in many countries the property tax 
has powerful political enemies. The tax strikes rich people quite directly, and the levy itself is 
visible. People with considerable wealth in property usually have considerable political 
power, and use that power to thwart taxes that aim directly at their holdings. As Burgess and 
Stern (1993: 802) suggest, low utilisation of property and land taxation 'reflects the success 
of the resistance of the rich and powerful to measures which harm their interests'. The result 
is that taxes are paid on a base that often bears little resemblance to the true level of 
property values (Franzsen, 2007: 8-9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When local governments administer the tax, they are responsible for maintaining property 
and ownership records, determining taxable property values, calculating and distributing 
property tax bills, managing receipt of payments, and applying tax enforcement against non-
payers (Mikesell 2002: 22). In other cases, local governments have a say in the tax rate, but 
the national revenue authority administers the tax. In some countries, for instance in Malawi, 
property valuation is done by the central government, while local authorities set rates and 
handle collection (ibid: 28). West African francophone countries in general rely on the 
traditional French model, in which the property tax is designed and administered by the 
central government. Anglophone African countries, with the exception of Liberia, rely on local 
administration (Brosio 2000; Jibao 2009). This is usually recommended in the literature, 
which stresses that taxes should be administered by the government that is entitled to their 
revenue. However, mixed results prevail in both anglophone and francophone Africa. 
 
The most common form of property tax in anglophone countries is on property value, even 
though there may be little capacity to implement accurate valuation practices. Availability of 
relevant property registers and data is generally limited, except in South Africa. Valuation 
rolls, if they exist, are normally out of date. Lack of qualified valuers to prepare or maintain 
valuation rolls is also a challenge, again with South Africa as an exception (Franzsen 2007). 
Efforts to address these shortfalls are reflected in a noticeable move away from relying on 
central government valuation offices to prepare valuation rolls (e.g. in Lesotho, Malawi, 
Box 4: Property taxation and political engagement in Kenya 
 
During the 1980s members of the Karen and Langata District Association (KLDA) in 
Kenya became increasingly frustrated with high municipal property taxes and the 
absence of effective service provision and fiscal transparency. In response the KLDA 
went to court to demand that the city council improved transparency before collecting 
additional taxes. The KLDA won the case, though the city council refused to comply. 
Consequently, property taxes were placed by KLDA members into an untouched bank 
account for over a decade. 
 
In recent years the KLDA has offered to release the funds if the city council will grant 
them greater control over local planning and public spending. Although the lack of 
progress is discouraging, there is some hope that the initial tax conflict may lead to a 
more constructive partnership between the district association and the government. 
 
Source: Prichard (2010: 40). 
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Mauritius, Swaziland, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia). Some countries, for instance 
South Africa and Uganda, have introduced ‘mass valuation’ as an alternative to discrete 
valuations of individual properties, or are considering doing this (e.g. Kenya). However, 
external quality control with regard to valuation rolls is practically non-existent. Only the new 
South African legislation provides for ministerial oversight regarding the effectiveness, 
consistency, uniformity, and application of municipal valuations.  
 
Most countries apply different tax rates to different types of property (Franzsen 2007). Rates 
are generally determined annually (e.g. Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland). In 
some instances they are set by central government or municipal by-laws for a fixed or 
indefinite period, so rates may remain static for years (e.g. Ghana and Tanzania). Where 
differential rates apply, the tax rates for residential properties tend to be significantly lower 
than the rates for commercial, industrial, and government properties, when these are taxable 
(e.g. Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia).  
 
There is generally a distinction between imposing tax on land or buildings. Since land in 
many African countries is owned by the state, often only buildings are included in the 
property tax base. This applies to Tanzania, Ghana, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. Kenya 
is the only African country with a land value tax, while South Africa has a uniform, capital 
value tax. Nigeria is unique in having formally delegated the authority for property tax 
legislation to the 36 state governments, leaving the various areas in Nigeria with different 
approaches to estimating property tax (Franzsen and Youngman, 2009: 12). The property tax 
base in some countries in anglophone West Africa is summarised in Box 5. 
 
 
 
In theory, assessment of property value and revenue collection are straightforward: conduct 
a cadastral survey that assesses the market or site value of each plot of land or property, 
and send a tax bill to each owner. In practice, however, cadastral surveys are expensive and 
time-consuming (Bahl et al. 2003: 79). The task is often beyond the financial and technical 
capability of many local governments (see Box 6). Tax offices in many sub-Saharan African 
countries, except in South Africa, are short on assessors, if they have any at all (Farvacque-
Vitkovic and Godin 1998). In Uganda, for instance, there were eleven certified land and 
property valuators responsible for valuing three million parcels in 2002 (McCluskey et al. 
Box 5: The property tax base in anglophone West Africa  
 
In Sierra Leone, property tax (known as City Rate in Freetown and Town Rate in other 
urban towns) is levied on buildings whether occupied or unoccupied. Although the tax 
base includes government buildings (whether owned or occupied), government has not 
been paying property tax over the years for buildings it owns. Ideally, councils agree not 
to levy tax on government owned buildings in return for councils not having to pay 
whatever they may owe to the central government. 
 
In Ghana, property tax is levied on premises comprising buildings or structures or similar 
developments (Local Government Act 1993). Vacant lands do not attract tax. However, 
with effect from January 2008, different (flat) rates are assigned to undeveloped plots 
located in different areas in the Accra Metropolitan. 
 
In The Gambia, property tax (known as Compound Rate) is levied on premises which 
include: any building together with all lands occupied therewith which is a distinct or 
separate holding or tenancy; any land whether developed or underdeveloped; or any 
wharf pier or ramp (Section 2, General Rate Act 1992). The rates are levied on the basis 
of an assessment in respect of the capital value of property in the rating areas.  
 
Source: Jibao (2009). 
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2003). The corresponding figures for Tanzania were approximately 100 certified valuators 
and five million parcels. Thus, it is difficult to conduct and maintain assessments, which often 
are eroded by inflation. It is difficult to administer, particularly when property prices are 
changing rapidly. Accordingly, the property tax base is inelastic, despite growth in the 
physical size or value of property, because old valuations are not updated and new 
properties not identified. In most cases, the system has been inherited from the colonial era 
and is poorly suited to present conditions. 
 
Box 6: Deficient property tax administration in Kampala 
 
The seriously deficient administration of the property tax in Uganda exemplifies the 
difficulties this tax has in providing substantial revenues to local governments in Africa. 
Although any local authority has the legal right to levy property taxes, in practice only 
municipalities and town councils levy them. Undeveloped land is not taxed, which inhibits the 
efficient use thereof. 
 
The property tax is based on seriously outdated valuations, which are very low, although the 
law requires that valuations be carried out every five years. Many valuable properties are not 
taxed at all, and many newly refurbished buildings have not been revalued. Systems of 
recording and valuing properties are seriously deficient. This is partly because the skilled 
technical staff needed to organise and supervise valuation work are in short supply. 
 
The city of Kampala also shows a phenomenon that is taking place in many other 
metropolitan areas in Africa. Its urbanised area has expanded beyond its municipal 
boundaries, but neighbouring districts are either not allowed to levy property tax on 
residential properties, or abstain from doing so because they still have to provide basic urban 
services to these areas. Low revenue is also attributable to poor collection, huge delays in 
payments, or simply non-payment. Non-payment also derives from the high mobility of 
people, frequent property sales/exchanges, and the inadequate registration of titles. 
 
Source: McCluskey et al. (2003). 
 
Property registers and valuation rolls (cadastral systems) may work in areas with regular 
street patterns, named streets, and numbered houses. In the absence of street addresses, 
tax bills are not deliverable, and penalties are unenforceable. Although revenue collection 
may also prove to be problematic in areas where the property matrix is in place, the absence 
or scarcity of clear ownership titles is a serious challenge facing this form of taxation. 
Collection is often poor and many bills go unpaid because taxpayers are not identified, or 
they resist payment because their housing conditions are too poor or urban basic services 
are not provided to their areas. In principle, non-compliance of property tax can be enforced 
by confiscation and sale of the owner’s personal effects in the building initially, and ultimately 
through the collateral of the real estate itself. However, experience shows that courts are 
often swamped by appeals from angry property owners and landowners (Skinner 1993: 364). 
Moreover, harsh enforcement mechanisms may result in intervention from politicians facing 
complaints from their constituents (Enemuo 2000: 193). Thus, high administrative and 
political costs are the crucial problems of property taxation. 
  
Expert opinion diverges on how to improve property taxation in developing countries.7 Some 
blame the excessive centralisation of property tax policy, which prevents setting higher tax 
rates. Others blame what they consider the almost total anarchy deriving from local 
government freedom in this field. There is also dispute over tax administration. Certainly, 
                                                     
7  Dillinger (1991) provides an insightful summary of these challenges, which is still valid. 
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property taxes have many attractions as local bases, but they also have obvious weaknesses 
that need to be taken into consideration before heavy reliance is placed on them. Often the 
capability and capacity of the municipality are inadequate to administrate the property tax at 
a low cost (McCluskey et al. 2003: 23). As noted above, these administrative weaknesses 
are manifested in problems of valuation and arbitrariness in tax assessment and 
enforcement.  
 
Foreign donors have funded many projects aiming to reform the property tax system and 
build local administrative capacity, with mixed results. However, if property tax is to play a 
greater role in municipal finances, the administrative and technical features of the system 
must not become obstacles. Hence, technical assistance should prioritise appropriate 
training of property valuators and upgrading relevant skills of municipal staff. Current 
legislation is often a major obstacle in many countries (for example, in Tanzania and 
Uganda), and needs to be revised (McCluskey et al. 2003). The Municipal Property Rates 
Act of 2004 in South Africa shows that it is feasible to address some of these problems by 
stipulating nationally uniform mechanisms of assessment, and a monitoring process to 
ensure assessment quality.  
 
Clearly, property tax has to be simplified to adapt it to the reality of many African countries. 
Ambitious cadastral projects were undertaken in the 1980s, but many of them failed or were 
abandoned halfway, as in Cameroon, Mali, and Senegal. Today, advisors therefore 
recommend the use of very simple parametric methods for the evaluation of property values. 
Parameters could include the number of rooms, the quality of the building materials, and the 
area of the city where the building is located. Such parameters are transparent and, in 
general, easy to apply. Such methods have been used in a number of countries (also in 
Western Europe) with satisfactory results. Administration could be left local, but the legal 
framework should be centrally provided. Nevertheless, research undertaken by the Africa 
Tax Institute8 argues that many African countries face major challenges if the property tax is 
to provide a reliable and adequate source of revenue for municipalities. In some countries 
even the rationality and administrative feasibility of property tax policies and current 
legislation must be questioned. 
 
3.2 Business licences 
 
In anglophone Africa, the standard mechanism for mobilising revenues from businesses has 
been through licensing. Although the original intent was regulatory, in most places local 
business licensing has increasingly become simply a revenue source. Typically, business 
licences generate between 5 and 30 per cent of local government own revenue in urban 
councils. In many countries, however, the system has been quite unsatisfactory. It has often 
been quite inequitable, imposed huge costs on business, and generated relatively little 
money. In Uganda, for instance, a common complaint from small and medium-sized 
enterprises has been that ‘they do not know what to pay, where and to whom’. The 
regulatory aspects of the licence system have been largely abandoned. In addition, poor 
policy design and weak administration mean that licence coverage, assessment, collection, 
and enforcement rates are low, leading to poor revenue generation. 
 
Local business taxes are generally levied in one of two ways (Devas and Kelly 2001: 384): 
either as a fixed amount, which usually varies by type, size, or location of the business; or as 
a percentage of turnover or profits. Assessing turnover or profitability, however, is difficult 
both in relation to small businesses, which often do not maintain proper records, and to large 
businesses with multiple premises across various jurisdictions. Thus, local business taxes 
often use proxies for turnover or profitability, such as the size of premises, type of business, 
number of employees, installed electricity power, etc. 
                                                     
8  Africa Tax Institute web page: www.ATI.up.za (last accessed 15.09.2012). 
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Obtaining a licence typically involves multiple visits to various offices, sometimes over 
several days, with associated travel costs. Failure to provide the correct licence receipts may 
result in closure of the premises. Consequently, the system is often riddled with rent seeking 
and corruption. Poor administration often means that many businesses are not included in 
the licence system due to lack of proper business registers (Arajou-Bonjean and Chambas 
2003; Brun et al 2012). Weak financial management often means that collection and 
enforcement provisions are rarely enforced. This erodes the tax base and introduces 
inequities into the system. Thus, many existing business licence systems across Africa 
contain serious defects. These include (Devas and Kelly 2001: 385): 
 
• high compliance costs to businesses, due to multiple licensing and complex 
procedures; 
• tariff structures that are complicated and do not reflect ability to pay; 
• a process loaded with ineffective regulatory requirements, which provide opportunities 
for rent seeking; 
• poor administration and evasion, which reduce the tax base and generate inequities; 
and 
• a revenue source that generates relatively little income for local governments. 
 
Several African countries have reformed (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), or are in the 
process of reforming, their local business licence systems, to make them simpler, more 
transparent, and effective (Sander 2003; URT 2005; USAID 2005).9 The main objectives of 
these reforms are to enable local authorities to collect significantly more revenue, and to 
reduce the compliance burden on businesses. In the late 1990s, Kenya pioneered a single 
business permit (SBP) system, which has since become a model for other countries in the 
region (see Box 7). 
 
The Kenyan SBP system was introduced on an optional basis in 1999, with all local 
authorities being required to adopt it from January 2000. According to Devas and Kelly 
(2001: 387), the initial reports were positive. However, a major problem experienced during 
implementation was the lack of effective dialogue and communication with the local business 
community in the early stages, leading to misunderstandings and some initial resistance to 
the reform. Moreover, some local authorities chose inappropriate tariff sets – usually too 
high. This led to tax resistance from local traders. There were also cases of business 
misclassification (over-assessment), leading to calls for improved administration, 
transparency, and accountability (Devas and Kelly 2001). On the positive side, however, 
most local governments experienced substantial increases in revenue – some councils more 
than doubled their revenue from this source in one year. In some cases, this was due to 
improvements in coverage of the revenue base, but in most cases the increase was due to 
choosing higher tariff sets (ibid: 388). 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
9  Business licences were abolished in Tanzania in 2004. Before the abolition, business licences accounted for 
between 20% and 30% of the total own revenue in municipalities (Fjeldstad et al 2010a). In 2011, the government 
reintroduced business licences as a local government revenue base (URT 2011).  
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Box 7: The Single Business Permit (SBP) in Kenya 
 
The Kenyan business licence reform has the following components: 
 
1. Local business licensing is decoupled from regulatory requirements, since these are 
usually ineffective and create opportunities for rent seeking. 
 
2. All economic activities within the local jurisdiction are, in principle, included in the base. 
The law was amended to broaden the base to include all businesses and trades, 
including professionals such as lawyers, doctors, and private consultants. This aimed to 
widen the revenue base and to improve equity, while at the same time minimising the 
economic distortions of the licence system. To avoid double taxation, the central 
government abolished its registration fees on professionals. 
 
3. Businesses are only required to have one business permit per premise regardless of the 
range of activities carried out there, hence the name Single Business Permit (SBP). 
 
4. Local authorities are required to establish ‘one-stop-shops’, at which permits will be 
issued on the spot in exchange for the appropriate fee. The philosophy is a more 
customer-oriented approach to business licensing. 
 
5. A standardised rate structure is established. Businesses are classified into eight sectors, 
which are subdivided into broad categories reflecting the scale of profitability of the 
business. These size categories are based on easily identifiable and objective criteria. 
The system is based on self-declaration, but with the opportunity for official checking. 
 
6. The tariff structure is designed to be progressive, with smaller businesses paying less 
than larger ones. The system provides a standard tariff structure for all local authorities, 
but still allows local government discretion over the actual tariff rates. 
 
7. Measures are taken to improve the local administration of the system. This includes the 
design of simplified SBP registration forms. Training is provided to encourage local 
authorities to work with the local business community in choosing the SBP tariff schedule. 
 
Source: Devas and Kelly (2001). 
 
In both Kenya and Uganda, the time required to obtain business permits has been 
substantially reduced due to the introduction of one-stop-shops (Box 8). This has cut the 
compliance costs of enterprises, though not necessarily the total costs since the tariffs have 
been raised. In general, however, collection performance remains a problem and there is a 
need for improved financial management. However, the early evidence is fairly positive 
(Gamser 2003). The new system seems to enable local authorities to enhance revenues. At 
the same time, compliance costs on businesses are lowered and the opportunities for rent 
seeking and corruption are reduced. 
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Box 8: Streamlining business registration in Entebbe municipality, Uganda 
Until recently, the business registration and licensing system in Uganda was very 
complicated and time-consuming. On average, it took 36 days to register a business. Hence, 
many small and micro enterprises avoided the registration process and remained informal. 
A one-stop simplified business registration and licensing system was piloted in Entebbe in 
2002–2003. The results of the pilot include: 
• The licensing process became cheaper and shorter. Overall, the compliance costs for 
enterprises were reduced by 75% (for example, registration time was reduced to 30 
minutes). 
• Compliance levels for registration improved by 43%. 
• Total revenue collection increased by 40%. 
• Administrative costs for the council were reduced. Administrative savings were 25% in 
staff time and 10% in financial resources. 
• There were reduced opportunities for bribery. 
• Relations between local authority staff and businesses were improved. 
Source: Sander (2003). 
 
In francophone Africa, local governments levy a tax called the Patente, which was originally 
based on the French Taxe Professionelle (Devas and Kelly 2001). In Cote D’Ivoire, the 
Patente was the largest single local revenue source in the 1990s, financing about 17 per cent 
of the local government budget, and more in the commercial capital Abidjan. The calculation 
of this tax is quite complex, involving the value of the premises, number of employees, 
turnover, machinery employed, installed energy capacity, and other size proxies. Moreover, 
within this formula, rental value of premises is by far the largest factor, so the tax starts to 
resemble a property tax. 
 
Atypical for anglophone Africa, urban councils in Tanzania levy a local business tax called 
the City Service Levy (CSL). The CSL is levied as a fixed percentage of the firm’s turnover 
(0.1 per cent of turnover for the bank/financial sector, and 0.3 per cent for other sectors). It is 
a major local tax in municipalities. For instance, in Ilala Municipality, Dar es Salaam, the CSL 
generated in 2006/07 more than 47 per cent of the total revenues from the municipal’s own 
sources (Fjeldstad et al 2010a). For the large VAT-registered taxpayers, CSL-billing is levied 
quarterly; it is paid annually for the majority of small taxpayers who are not registered for 
VAT (URT 2003: 34). The amount billed is in essence a provisional tax based on 30 per cent 
of the firm’s presumed annual turnover. Monitoring the turnover of large numbers of small 
businesses, data collection and maintenance of tax registers have proved to be costly and 
time-consuming. Information sharing and professional working relations between the 
municipalities and relevant central government bodies for the purposes of the CSL are only 
utilised to a limited extent. Hence, on various occasions the issue has been raised whether 
CSL should be collected as part of Corporate Income Tax by the central government’s tax 
agency, the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA). However, municipalities have expressed 
concern that if the City Service Levy were to be collected by the TRA, central government 
may too easily retain the revenue or merely seize taxing powers for this source of revenue 
(ibid: 35). 
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3.3 User fees – linking payment and service delivery 
 
Taxes are not the best mechanism for matching demand and supply of public services. 
Better links can be achieved through cost-recovery charging systems, which tie the amount 
paid directly to the amount consumed. By providing a more direct link between citizens’ 
contributions and service delivery, such mechanisms may be more a effective way to recover 
the costs of service provision, and to promote efficiency in the consumption of the service. 
Hence, most observers argue that user fees should play a prominent role in local 
government finance (Bahl et al. 2003: 76; Bird 2001). 
 
The main economic rationale for user charges is not to produce revenue, but to encourage 
the efficient use of resources within the public sector. When properly designed, user charges 
provide information to public sector suppliers on how much clients are willing to pay for 
particular services, and ensure that citizens value what the public sector supplies. Free or 
subsidised services may result in over-consumption of such services, and it may prove 
difficult to target the beneficiaries of free services (Box 9). Yet, experience from several 
countries, including Namibia and South Africa, show that user charges can impose a heavy 
burden on lower-income service users, and exclude the poorer segments of the urban 
population from the services (Fjeldstad et al 2005; McDonald and Pape 2002). Adjustments 
can, however, be made to offset such effects. For instance, user charges can reflect 
differences in ability to pay by incorporating sliding scales for the type of user or the amount 
of usage (Rondinelli et al. 1989: 71), although this will require adequate administrative 
capacity. 
 
Box 9: Free services to the poor in South Africa 
 
Improved service delivery to the poor is a priority for most African governments. In South 
Africa, for instance, the two pillars of this policy are to enable local governments to: 
• make basic municipal services accessible to all citizens, and 
• provide free basic services for poor citizens who cannot pay. 
The challenge with respect to service delivery is to ensure that poor households are the 
primary beneficiaries of the free services policy and associated resources. Since July 2001, 
every municipality in South Africa is supposed to provide at least the minimum free ‘lifeline’ 
supply to households of 6,000 litres of water and 50 kW of electricity per month. 
Some observers have raised concerns with the manner in which this lifeline policy has been 
designed and implemented. Firstly, it is argued that the quantity of free services provided is 
too small. Secondly, since households are not means tested to see if they qualify for the free 
services, some middle- and upper-income households are benefiting more than poor 
households. Finally, there is the problem of delivering free services across the country, 
particularly in rural areas. Therefore, many municipalities have developed indigent registers 
to ensure that free basic services are provided to the poor. 
Source: Fjeldstad (2004). 
 
User charges for trading services, including water, electricity, sewage, and solid waste 
removal, are major sources of revenue in urban municipalities in Southern Africa, especially 
in Namibia and South Africa (Fjeldstad et al. 2005; Bahl and Smoke 2003). In particular, 
service charges on water and electricity supply are important. This revenue is generated by a 
surcharge. This is either added to the cost of the utilities that the local authorities typically 
buy from the utility companies, or, if the authority itself produces the utility, added to the cost 
of producing it. 
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According to Bahl et al. (2003: 77), around a quarter of the electricity-distributing authorities 
in South Africa raise substantial revenues from the surpluses earned from their sales. A large 
share of these revenues is used to cover the cost of providing the service. However, in some 
municipalities a substantial surplus is left for general local government purposes. Hence, the 
tax component of the user fee is hidden for ratepayers, and the true level of local government 
taxation is not transparent to citizens. This undermines the potential accountability capability 
of the local revenue system. Moreover, since the consumer price of the service (for example, 
electricity) is overstated by the amount of the implicit tax, this may have negative impacts on 
economic efficiency. 
 
In Namibia, the majority of town councils are not determining their tariffs in accordance with 
an approved tariff policy of cost recovery (Fjeldstad et al 2005). Hence, several trading 
services, including water distribution, are operated with significant losses in a number of local 
authorities. This is also the situation for around a quarter of the municipalities in South Africa 
(Bahl and Smoke 2003). The situation is worsened by an increasing number of outstanding 
debtors in many local authorities – consumers who do not pay for basic services due to 
various reasons, including affordability. 
 
Experience from South Africa and Namibia shows that there are a number of obvious 
constraints on user charges and other means of cost recovery. These arise from equity 
considerations (i.e. ability to pay), collection and billing methods (Box 10), the quality of the 
services provided, and persistent resistance to paying. These lessons show that dealing with 
the policy problem of revenue enhancement requires some understanding of the factors 
underlying the individual’s decision of whether or not to pay service charges (and taxes). 
 
Box 10: Improving compliance through shared private water taps in Ondangwa, 
Namibia 
 
Residents in the poor informal settlements in Ondangwa Town Council, Northern Namibia, 
generally prefer a pre-paid water system, since it offers the opportunity to economise on 
water consumption and to control expenses, thus avoiding situations where bills cannot be 
paid and supplies are cut. However, communal taps frequently break down, often due to 
misuse. Repair work is slow, often requiring spare parts that are not available in the country. 
In January 2004, for instance, Ondangwa Town Council ran twenty-five communal taps with 
pre-paid cards, ten of which did not work due to damage caused by vandalism. Residents 
relying on communal taps complained that vandals are usually non-residents. 
In order to avoid heavy reliance on unreliable communal taps, residents of the informal 
settlements have been calling for private taps with a pre-paid system, which was then only 
available in the formal settlements. Lacking this option, many residents of the informal 
settlements instead chose to pool resources and share a private tap connection, even though 
it was not pre-paid. In this system, three or more households shared one private tap 
connection, located in and ascribed to one of the participating households. Sharing the bill, 
that is, paying equal shares of the connection fees and the expenses related to water usage, 
reduced the average costs for each household. More importantly, it decreased the risk of 
disconnection due to non-payment, since all parties had an interest in keeping the supply 
running. Members in the arrangement who repeatedly failed to contribute to the water bills 
were eventually excluded. The concomitant loss of an assured water-source represented an 
effective regulatory and enforcing mechanism. 
 
Source: Fjeldstad et al (2005). 
 
 25 
An increasing amount of evidence suggests that the rate of contribution to a public good is 
affected by factors such as citizens’ trust in others, and the trustworthiness of the 
government (Slemrod 2003). Without trust there is little basis for social cooperation and 
voluntary compliance with laws and regulations that could potentially benefit everyone. In 
particular, three dimensions of trust seem to affect citizens’ compliance: (1) trust in the local 
government to use revenues to provide expected services; (2) trust in local government to 
establish fair procedures for revenue collection; and (3) trust in other citizens to pay their 
share. The larger the fraction of the local population that is observed not paying, the lower is 
the perceived risk of being prosecuted. This has an impact on the individual ratepayer’s 
perception of the credibility and trustworthiness of the revenue administration. Moreover, the 
attitude of local political leaders with respect to payment seems to be important, for example, 
by legitimising non-payment through their own behaviour. This suggests that there are 
reasons and scope for innovation. 
 
The problems of non-payment should therefore be attacked on several fronts, including 
service delivery, better administration and payment schemes, and community involvement 
(Fjeldstad 2004). To achieve this, in-depth knowledge and data are required on payment 
levels for each ward, the proportion of municipal accounts delivered, the number and type of 
complaints received, living conditions for the poorest segments of the population, including 
the elderly and unemployed, etc. Moreover, customer care must show that complaining will 
bring results. Citizens should be encouraged to report faults, such as leaking taps or 
streetlights not functioning. The prompt redress of such complaints may help convince 
people that the municipality means business. Furthermore, citizens’ involvement in 
identifying problems and setting priorities may generate a greater sense of community 
involvement. Initially, it might be advisable to link payment directly to visible improvements in 
services. Finally, if local government officials, councillors, and community leaders were to 
cooperate in setting common goals, it might help develop trust. 
 
 
4 Local government tax collection practices 
 
Local government authorities commonly experience difficulty in collecting taxes, fees and 
charges. Thus, there are many experiments to find ways of making tax collection produce 
more revenue. Practices for collection of local taxes range from cases where local 
government authorities collect taxes themselves, to cases where tax collection is outsourced 
to the central government, private agents, or semi-private partners, such as when market 
cooperatives or private companies collect tax on behalf of the local government.  
 
Some taxes and fees are collected by the government and channelled back to the local 
government. In Malawi the non-tax revenue is collected by the central government, before 
the resources are redistributed to District Assemblies using a formula approved by the 
Cabinet (Malawi Government 1998). A less typical example is from Tanzania, where the 
collection of property tax in Dar es Salaam is assigned to the Tanzania Revenue Authority 
(Fjeldstad et al 2011).  
 
In Tanzania, collection of a large number of local government revenue sources has been 
outsourced in recent years (Fjeldstad et al. 2009b). They include private collection of 
property taxes in some urban councils; market fees in both rural and urban councils; forestry 
levies (until 2005) mainly in rural councils; cess on certain agricultural products in rural 
councils; bus stand and parking fees. In Mwanza City Council, for instance, private agents 
collected more than one-third of the council’s own revenue in 2006.  
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Revenue collection is outsourced to a range of different types of agents within and across 
councils. Another example from Mwanza City Council shows how the collection of fish 
market fees was outsourced to a fish dealer organisation, and the collection of fees at the 
central market was contracted to a vegetable cooperative operating in the market. In Kilosa 
District Council the collection of forest levies (until they were abolished in 2005) was 
outsourced to a private company, whose main activity was to run private schools. Iringa 
District Council contracted village councils to collect revenue from village businesses. 
 
Evidence is inconclusive as to whether outsourcing has led to better revenue administration 
performance compared to when tax collection remains a function of local government 
officials. However, outsourcing can establish a platform from which change can be facilitated, 
but its initial impact and longer-term successful performance depend on:  
 
• the strength and quality of the management of the local government authority;  
• political commitment to support the reform; and 
• transparency, reflected in the provision of accessible and updated information to the 
general public on the tendering process and bids received, as well as data on the 
revenue potential and actual collection (Fjeldstad et al 2010a).  
 
A major challenge facing privatised revenue collection in local government authorities is to 
assess the revenue potential for various tax bases. Usually revenue assessment is 
conducted on an ad hoc basis, often based on the previous year’s reported collection. 
Substantial underestimation of the revenue potential may imply that actual collection by the 
agent is substantially higher than what is reflected in the contract. Consequently, there is a 
risk of ending up in a situation where the agent keeps a substantial portion of the revenue 
collected; this already seems to be the case in some councils. In a study from Uganda, 
Iversen et al (2006) found substantial gaps between the local government estimates of the 
revenue yields from local markets with the actual revenue yield collected by private agents 
(see Figure 3). In six markets studied, the gaps (lost revenues) amounted to between 25 per 
cent and 74 per cent of total revenue collected in each market. Moreover, the actual gross 
margins realised by private agents caused by this undervaluation of market yields varied 
between 71 per cent and 970 per cent. Thus, it seems evident that rather than enhancing 
local revenue, the private tax collection system in Uganda transfers money from ordinary and 
often poor rural taxpayers into the pockets of private tax agents and their various associates. 
On average, 53 per cent of all revenue collected from vendors in the markets could be 
interpreted as pure redistributive transfers to members of the local elite. 
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Figure 3: Rents in tendering contracts for a rural market in Uganda 
 
Source: Iversen et al. (2006: 324). 
 
There are examples suggesting that public officials are more effective as revenue collectors 
than their private alternatives. For instance, over a two-year period Temeke municipal staff in 
Dar es Salaam added about 80,000 properties to the municipality’s flat tax property register 
at the cost of less than USD 1 per property. During the same period, private consultants who 
were engaged by the municipality added only 5,000 properties at a cost of USD 17 per 
property (Franzsen 2007:10-11).   
 
 
5 Concluding remarks and tentative 
implications for policy 
 
Despite major reforms of the central government tax system during the last two decades, 
local government tax systems remain largely neglected. This study shows that the local tax 
systems often are distortive, costly to administer, and exacerbate inequity. Generally, little or 
no coordination with respect to taxation is observed between various levels of government. 
This has partly to do with lack of capacity at all levels. This has led to double taxation of the 
same revenue base, as well as inconsistencies between local and central government tax 
policies. In some countries, local governments impose high taxes on export crops, 
inconsistent with the national government’s policy to encourage export production. 
Furthermore, while central government taxes affect only relatively few people directly, local 
government taxation affects many more. Local government taxation is therefore central to a 
better understanding of state-citizen relations. 
 
While the current potential for most rural councils to raise substantial own revenue is limited, 
the potential for revenue enhancement in urban councils is better. However, one major 
administrative problem today for many urban councils in anglophone Africa is their inability to 
collect all the revenue due to them. There are huge gaps between reported and projected 
revenues, particularly in many municipalities. This is due to: (1) poor administrative capacity 
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to assess the revenue base; (2) poor administrative capacity to enforce the payment of 
taxes; (3) explicit and intentional tax evasion and resistance from taxpayers; (4) corruption, 
including embezzlement of revenues; (5) external pressure on the local finance department 
to provide optimistic projections; and (6) political pressure on the local tax administration to 
relax revenue collection, especially during election periods. In this setting, fundamental 
issues to be addressed in the context of local government fiscal reforms are to redesign the 
current revenue structure and to strengthen financial management. In addition, measures are 
required to enhance taxpayers’ compliance and to improve the accountability of revenue 
collectors and elected councillors. This cannot be achieved without substantial and 
consistent political support from the central government. 
 
Improved information supplied to the public on budgets and accounts may improve the 
opportunities for citizens to exercise their voice and demand accountability from local 
authorities. This is among the lessons we can draw from decentralisation reform in Uganda 
(Reinikka and Svensson 2002). It is, however, important to stress that encouraging citizens 
and civil society to engage in fiscal and financial monitoring at the local level does not imply 
that such measures should replace formal auditing and accounting mechanisms. Nor does it 
imply that such measures will weaken the formal accountability mechanisms. On the 
contrary, it can strengthen the legitimacy and standing of local government authorities in the 
communities by contributing complementary measures to improve the control of revenue 
collection and expenditure. 
 
A fundamental requirement when redesigning the local revenue system is greater emphasis 
on the cost-effectiveness of revenue collection, taking into account not only the direct costs 
of tax administration, but also the overall costs to the economy, including the compliance 
costs to taxpayers. In addition, losses through corruption and tax evasion need to be 
reduced. To achieve these aims, there is a need to simplify the business licence and fee 
structures by reducing the number of rates and coverage. Moreover, local taxes and licences 
should be harmonised with central government tax bases, to avoid double taxation and 
conflicts with national development policies, such as job creation and private sector 
development (Pimhidzai and Fox 2011). The experiences from Kenya with the one-stop-shop 
Single Business Permit systems are promising for future reforms. 
 
More realism is also required when it comes to the implementation of a well-functioning 
property tax system. An important element of the fiscal decentralisation process in many 
countries has been to give municipalities the power to value, assess, bill, collect, and enforce 
property taxes. Property tax has many attractions as a local revenue base since it is imposed 
on immobile assets and therefore is difficult to avoid – at least in principle. However, it has 
some obvious weaknesses that need to be taken into consideration before heavy reliance is 
placed on it. In particular, problems of valuation and tax enforcement often occur due to 
political intervention and administrative weaknesses. The municipalities’ capacity and 
capability to administer the property tax have in general proved to be inadequate. It has been 
difficult for many municipalities across Africa to maintain the current property valuation 
registers, let alone continue the property valuation initiatives. It is therefore necessary to 
reassess the basis of the property tax in urban councils and to implement a simpler and more 
coherent approach to valuation provision, taking into consideration administrative capacity 
and capability constraints facing the urban councils. A pragmatic policy approach is required, 
which may imply centralisation of certain issues, such as management of property titles, 
valuation assessments, etc. 
 
Local own revenue is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for fiscal decentralisation. In 
most local government authorities in Africa, local sources are generally not sufficient to 
develop and supply adequate services for the fast-growing population. The reality is that 
most local government authorities in anglophone Africa will continue to be heavily dependent 
on fiscal transfers from the central government for a long time. Only a few large urban 
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governments located in rich areas are able to finance a substantial proportion of their total 
expenditure with their own revenue sources. Transfer systems based upon revenue sharing 
between the central and subnational levels of government and grants from the central level 
should therefore be considered important components of fiscal decentralisation programmes. 
 
 
6 Issues for further research 
 
Based on the knowledge gaps identified in this study, we suggest below areas for further 
research on local government taxation in anglophone Africa. Both technical and political 
economy questions are under-explored in the literature. Combining research on the technical 
administrative framework for local taxation with the political and economic realities at the 
local and central level has the potential to identify constraints and practices that can guide 
policy work, and be used as benchmarks to assess actual policy implementation.  
 
Financial transfers from the centre are typically important components of local government 
revenue. How does this impact on local government fiscal autonomy, which typically is 
formulated as a key objective of local tax reforms?  A series of research questions related to 
reform is suggested for further research: 
 
• How should effective revenue-raising systems for subnational governments be 
designed and implemented? This issue, and the distinction between urban and rural 
councils in particular, has received limited attention in the literature.  
• What are the actual fees, levies and taxes imposed locally compared to those 
officially stated in policy documents and in reform plans?  
• How do local government revenue reforms affect taxpayers? This should be 
investigated using time series with surveys immediately after, one year and three 
years after the reform. 
 
Some research finds that taxpayers perceive local governments to be more trustworthy and 
accountable than higher levels of government, while other findings point at the frail links 
between local revenue-raising and the responsiveness of African local governments. Existing 
research is neither conclusive nor extensive. We have therefore identified the following 
questions addressing local government accountability: 
 
• Is there a connection between local tax payment and service delivery? Is there any 
evidence on how partnerships (private, public, donor and local government) can 
result in more effective and sustainable local revenue mobilisation?  
• Where do we find examples that prove a link between local taxation and expanded 
responsiveness and accountability? 
• Are there good practices from private tax collection concerning taxpayer education, 
accountability and revenue raising?  
 
An entry point to assess these questions will be through case studies of fiscal reforms in 
selected municipalities in Africa.  
 
Local government own revenue primarily comes from property tax, business licences and 
user fees. Currently the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the Africa Tax Institute (ATI) are 
conducting a comprehensive research programme that aims to collect and systematise data 
on the present status and future prospects of property-related taxes in all 54 African 
countries, with a primary focus on land and building taxes and real estate transfer taxes. 
Since the political economy analysis of land and property taxes is not explicitly addressed in 
this programme, we will explore the possibility to partner with the Lincoln Institute and ATI to 
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conduct complementary research on property taxation. In-depth political economy analysis of 
business licences may contribute to gaining valuable insights on entrepreneurship, incentives 
and the rights of small business owners. The World Bank’s Doing Business reports (2010a, 
b) have some data on this, but they only cover a limited number of countries and provide little 
background detail on the data. Finally, research suggests that citizens will be more willing to 
pay tax when there is a direct link between payment and service provision (quid pro quo). 
More research is needed to better understand the earmarking of taxes for specific purposes 
and whether (and under what conditions) user fees/service charges can become efficient 
local revenue sources.  
 
Collection methods vary substantially between local government authorities within and 
across anglophone Africa. In some countries, e.g. in Tanzania and Uganda, local 
governments have outsourced revenue collection of some taxes to private agents. Evidence 
is inconclusive on what collection methods work under what conditions, and how local 
governments can best manage the different collection methods. Some suggestions for 
further research will focus on private revenue collection:  
 
• Which revenue bases are outsourced and why these? 
• Which allowances and incentive systems exist for private collectors? 
• What are the revenue trends from different sources after outsourcing compared to the 
pre-outsourcing period?  
 
Future research should focus on building a more extensive empirical knowledge on the 
technical, economic and political dimensions of local government taxation. More broadly, the 
suggestions for further research in this paper focus on the politics of successful tax reform, 
new insights about taxation and growth, and on the connection between tax governance and 
state building at the local level. Donors will potentially benefit from the research topics 
suggested here, by getting policy relevant advice on how to support local government 
taxation more effectively.  
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